Is Washington Post editor Bob Woodward's description of the George W. Bush administration's faulty decision-making on the Iraq war really an angry account, as some critics say? State of Denial (2006, Simon and Schuster, 560 pages) has some angry moments and insightful passages. But its main trait, a torrent of monotonous details about meetings and who-said-what-when, may put most readers to sleep.
Long a leading investigative journalist, Woodward writes not necessarily for individual readers so much as for history. In this, his 14th book and third of four about Bush war-mongering, the author relies on interviews with the former “national security team, their deputies and other senior and key players in the administration responsible for the military, the diplomacy and the intelligence on the Iraq war”. His other books include Bush at War (2002), Plan of Attack (2004) and The War Within: A Secret White House History (2008).
Weaknesses in Bush's “war-torn White House” look obvious. “But in studying the Iraq intelligence… this superior technical intelligence had become a crutch – a wait for the next satellite pass culture…. The downside was that it was collection from a distance. They had almost no on-the-ground intelligence, the sort they'd need to find the WMD they were sure Saddam was hiding.”
Faulty assumptions and intellectual laziness led Bush and his team astray, especially in the search for weapons of mass destruction. “For the pragmatist generals on the ground who were poised to launch a war over Saddam's alleged WMD, ironclad proof that the weapons were there was getting less and less relevant.”
“Two questions went unanswered during all the presentations, PowerPoint slides and discussions: Who was going to be in charge of Iraq the day after the serious combat ended? And, was there an Iraqi political process that could be tapped to help recruit people who could provide the basics – security, water, electricity – matters that are normally the responsibility of a mayor in an American city?”
Blame for many problems lands squarely on Bush. “Likewise, in these moments where Bush had someone from the field here in the chair beside him, he did not press, did not try to open the door himself and ask what the visitor had seen and thought. The whole atmosphere too often resembled a royal court, with Cheney and Rice in attendance, some upbeat stories, exaggerated good news, and a good time had by all.”
No matter how much bad news came from Iraq, Bush insisted on speaking publicly about progress, liberation and democracy. “But the giant problem now was the president's state of mind…. Bush was in denial about Iraq.” Stronger than Iraq itself, that mindset persisted. “Again and again, Bush talked about Iraq strategy in his campaign speeches, but never gave specifics. He talked about goals, expressed his optimism and determination, and gave pep talks…. His strategy was to make repeated declarations of optimism and avoid adding to any doubts.”
Ultimately, Woodward exposes flaws in Bush cohorts too. His sources call Donald Rumsfeld an arrogant, inflexible obstructionist. Condoleezza Rice looks well intentioned, but weaker than her strong-woman image. Colin Powell is principled and respected, but failed to win key policy debates.
Too many high-level meetings settled nothing. “Rumsfeld made his presentation looking at the president, while Powell looked straight ahead. Then Powell would make his to the president with Rumsfeld looking straight ahead. They didn't even comment on each other's statements or views. So Bush never had the benefit of a serious, substantive discussion between his principal advisers. And the president, whose legs often jiggled under the table, did not force a discussion.”
While many Bush advisors proved unreliable, one wasn’t even tangible. “Bush's deep religious convictions came up time and time again…. The president made it clear that he felt no doubt that a higher authority was looking after him and guiding him. ‘I get guidance from God in prayer,’ he said, and mentioned a number of times that he had asked for, prayed for and received such guidance.”
Even to the misguided millions who voted for Bush, searching for U.S. successes in Iraq since the 2003 invasion has a needle-in-the-haystack quality. By providing so many details, Woodward gives historians a big head-start on their work.
Approval rating: 61 per cent.
For more information: www.simonsays.com
(January 30, 2009)
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